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Abstract. In the last decade, a new class of cyber-threats has emerged.
This new cybersecurity adversary is known with the name of “Advanced
Persistent Threat” (APT) and is referred to different organizations that
in the last years have been “in the center of the eye” due to multi-
ple dangerous and effective attacks targeting financial and politic, news
headlines, embassies, critical infrastructures, TV programs, etc. In or-
der to early identify APT related malware, a semi-automatic approach
for malware samples analysis is needed. In our previous work we in-
troduced a malware triage step for a semi-automatic malware analysis
architecture. This step has the duty to analyze as fast as possible new
incoming samples and to immediately dispatch the ones that deserve a
deeper analysis, among all the malware delivered per day in the cyber-
space, the ones that really worth to be further examined by analysts.
Our paper focuses on malware developed by APTs, and we build our
knowledge base, used in the triage, on known APTs obtained from pub-
licly available reports. In order to have the triage as fast as possible, we
only rely on static malware features, that can be extracted with negligi-
ble delay, and use machine learning techniques for the identification. In
this work we move from multiclass classification to a group of oneclass
classifier, which simplify the training and allows higher modularity. The
results of the proposed framework highlight high performances, reaching
a precision of 100% and an accuracy over 95%.
1 Introduction
Since the origin of Internet, cyber-attacks have evolved in parallel with com-
puter development, changing ways and means of execution. From the first viruses
and worms to the modern botnet and rootkit, from the first singular and not-
organized attack to the advanced and well-crafted persistent one, all these kinds
of vector mutate their behavior updating their “source” in line with the new
software and hardware technologies. During the last two decades, the number
of delivered malware exponentially increased: according to a survey conducted
by Panda Security [1], just in 2015 about 230.000 malware were delivered per
day with an increase of 40% with respect to 2014, kneeling down different times
the cybersecurity community. Recent analysis from McAfee [17] calculated that
in the last quarter of 2017, there were discovered more than 60 millions of new
malware. In the mid-2000s, indeed, the black hat community evolved from adoles-
cent hackers to organized crime networks, fueling highly profitable identity theft
schemes with massive loads of personal data harvested from corporate and gov-
ernment networks. In recent times, in fact, a new powerful and dangerous threat
is on the rise, identified by the community as “Advanced Persistent Threat”
(APT). According to NIST Glossary of Key Information Security Terms1, APT
is “an adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and significant
resources which allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using
multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical and deception)”. Hence the APT
name identifies the main peculiarities of the threat:
Advanced Criminal minds behind attacks utilize the full spectrum of computer
intrusion technologies and techniques. While individual attacker may not
be classed as particularly “advanced” (e.g. single stage malware component
found on the black market), their operators typically access and develop
more advanced tools as required.
Persistent Criminal operators give priority to a specific task, rather than op-
portunistically seeking immediate financial gain. The attack is indeed con-
ducted through continuous monitoring and interaction in order to achieve
the defined objectives. A “low-and-slow” approach is usually more successful.
Threat The attack has a malicious nature. Malevolent attacker have a specific
objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and of course well funded.
Moreover this advanced attacks are strongly targeted in order to overcome all
the general defences that one can apply.
According to the FireEye studies [11], based on the huge amount of APT
operations they analyzed, APTs principally target big companies, critical in-
frastructure and institutions, in order to gain financial secrets, intellectual prop-
erties, national secret, private personal information or damage critical infrastruc-
ture by interrupting or decreasing their functionality. Despite different targets
and origin, it has been demonstrated that APTs perform attacks in a standard
way, that can be represented as an intrusion kill chain [7]. Reconnaissance phase
implies APT to define a clear understanding about the overall victim’s infras-
tructure, in order to hence perform the initial exploitation phase, where those
malicious organizations actually “enter” inside the victim systems. Given the
persistent appellation which characterizes APT, the next phase involves estab-
lish persistence in the host which provides attackers the possibility to install
backdoor or dropper for following attack stages. Lateral movement is actually
accomplished to escalate privileges and hence being able to elevate the capabil-
ity in the system. Finally, in the exfiltration phase the real aim of the attack is
achieved. It is hence important to identify any malware used by APTs in any
of these phases, so that other malware used in previous steps can be find and
analyzed and future activities can be synthesized.
1 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf
1.1 Contribution
It is evident that there is the need for a prioritization mechanism in order to
promptly identify samples that deserve to be further analyzed by secure analyst.
To this end, in this paper we propose a malware triage stage, where samples are
timely analyzed to understand as soon as possible whether they likely belong
to some known APT campaign and should be dispatched, with highest priority,
to human analysts for further analysis. We underline that the objective of this
triage stage is not APT malware detection, which is instead pursued at a later
stage by human analysts and specialized architecture components, rather the
final goal of the triage is spotting with the highest precision samples that seem
to be related to known APTs. There is hence the necessity of a triage stage that
has low computational complexity to timely analyze a great number of samples,
and provides at the same time high precision and accuracy. We privilege precision
to accuracy, in fact precision is necessary because the malware triage should not
prioritize non-APT malware (false positive), to not overload human analysts
and/or complex components with urgent but not necessary analyses. However
also, high accuracy is desired, with the aim of correctly identify that samples
really belonging to some known APT classes (true positive).
In our previous work [12], we proposed an approach based on a Random
Forest Classifier, trained on a knowledge base built upon a collection of reports
about APTs publicly released by cyber-security companies. The classifier, given
the set of features obtained from static analysis, outputs the APT class the
malware sample belongs to, or a “non-APT label”, in the case the sample is not
associated to any class. Such solution presents two problems. First of all, this
so called negative class has a cardinality of several orders of magnitude bigger
than the set of APT samples and there is a large variety among its samples.
We approached the problem by adding samples not related to APTs in the
training phase, but the number of used samples cannot be really representative
of the whole class. Finally, the solution works well and achieves great accuracy
and precision, but has the disadvantage of requiring a long training time and
needs to be retrained each time new APT samples or even a new APT class are
discovered.
To overcome such problems, in this paper we presents several key improve-
ments w.r.t. existing literature:
– We propose a novel modular and lightweight malware triage framework,
based on One-class classification which permits to train each classifiers only
on samples related to the relative class. This permits to add new APT classi-
fiers and modify a single classifier when new samples are discovered, without
affecting the whole triage framework;
– We design the malware triage framework on the Isolation Forest learning
concept. An Isolation Forest is hence trained on the samples of each class;
– We train the classifier with more than 2000 samples belonging to 19 differ-
ent APTs: Patchwork, APT29, Winnti Group, Lazarus Group, Carbanak,
Volatile Cedar, NSA, Transparent Tribe, Shiqiang, Roaming Tiger, Violin
Panda, Sandwork, Hurricane Panda, APT30, Mirage, Desert Falcon, Mol-
erats, APT28 and Lotus Blossom;
– We introduce features dimensionality reduction through Linear Discriminant
Analysis in order to decrease the computational time needed in the training
phase and increase the overall precision and accuracy for each class;
– We show that such approach allows fast, precise and also accurate identifi-
cation of APTs malware, through an experimental evaluation performed on
a dataset composed by samples obtained by public APT reports. We also
test its performance on a non-APT dataset.
2 Related Works
The awareness around APT is increasing in the last years, becoming an impor-
tant research topic within the cybersecurity area. Important works have been
done to deploy APT detection as well as avoidance frameworks in order to iden-
tify compromised hosts. In [13], authors propose the design of an architecture
composed by various tangled phases that starts from the uninterruptedcollec-
tion of malware and reports from different sources, continues through different
analysis components, that work on single element (like static analysis tools) and
on group of element (like classification algorithms) and at the end stores all
the information in a knowledge base that can be easily linked to other in order
to share different information. Inside such architecture several malware analysis
tools can be used. The number of works carried out to identify and classify mal-
ware samples, even if not focused on APT, is really huge, hence we here present
a small subset of them, more related to our work. In Section 2.1, we focus on
malware analysis through machine learning techniques, while in Section 2.2, we
present works related to APT malware.
2.1 Malware identification
An important malware analysis technique is the BitShred framework [8], which
extracts information from the sample and, using feature hashing, creates prob-
abilistic data structure in order to large-scale correlate samples. Another fast
and precise malware analysis framework proposed in [9] is SigMal, a framework
improving the state-of-the-art of the previous systems based on the concept of
malware similarity by leveraging signal processing techniques to extract noise-
resistant signatures from the samples. In [15], malware triage has been deployed
by machine learning classification using Artificial Neural Network. In particu-
lar, the dataset used in the classification involves 3131 samples spread over 24
different unique malware classes and the overall accuracy in detecting and clas-
sifying them is about 96%. Each binary executable is represented as a greyscale
image through GIST descriptors [19]; then neural networks are used to derive
and extract similar patterns among the various samples. In [2], Ahmadi et al.
propose a learning-based system using different malware characteristics to as-
sign malware samples to their corresponding families. Because of accurate and
fast classification, they propose to extract static features both from the binary
hex view and the assembly one to exploit complementary information by these
two representations, without relying on other information derivable from dy-
namic analysis of malware. Kong et al. [10] propose a framework for automated
malware classification based on function call graph of the malware. First, they
disassemble the single sample building the relative function call graph. Then,
discriminant malware distance is computed on each pair of samples: they per-
form pairwise graph matching between the attributed function call graphs of two
malware instances in order to measure their structural similarity. In [18], Nari
and Ghorbani introduce a framework for automated classification of malware
samples based on their network behavior. IP addresses, port numbers, protocols
and dependencies between network activities are abstracted for further analysis.
2.2 APT detection
Most works about APT detection focus on the identification of indicators of
suspicious activities, like anomaly detection systems. In [5], authors propose an
anomaly detection system for APTs built around several security logs caught.
In particular, this white-list based approach, keeps track of system events, their
dependencies and occurrences, learning the normal system behavior and report-
ing all strange actions. Another interesting work is the framework proposed by
Marchetti et al. [16] that aims to detect, among all the hosts inside the com-
pany, the ones infected by APT in order to be further analyzed in the future.
In line with the idea of the previous works, Ussath et al. [21] develop a Secu-
rity Investigation Framework (SIF) that supports the analysis and the tracing
of multi-stage APTs. In particular, it leverages different information sources, in
order to give a comprehensive overview of the different stages of an attack.
Our previous work [12] aims to recognize malware developed by APTs, but
contrary to the other described works, we focus on the sample analysis instead
of using the malware activity during the infection. The work achieves an high
precision and a very high accuracy in detecting the ownership of these kind of
malware, but suffers the problems highlighted in Section 1.
3 Tools
In this section, we introduce the main tools used in this paper. In particular,
Section 3.1 presenta on PEFrame, a static malware analysis tool we use for fea-
ture extraction, while we outline Random Forest and Isolation Forest in Sections
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Section 3.4 presents principles of feature reduction.
3.1 PEFrame
PEFrame2 is an open source tool that performs static analysis on Portable Ex-
ecutable malware and generic suspicious file. The Portable Executable format
2 https://github.com/guelfoweb/peframe
contains the information necessary for the Windows OS loader to manage the
wrapped executable code. It consists of the MS-DOS Stub, the PE file Header,
and the sections, and can provide an enormous amount of features, contain-
ing relevant information for a malware analyst. In particular, in our work, we
consider seven feature classes to be extracted from the PE, here presented:
Optional Header (30 features) Every file has an optional header that pro-
vides information to the loader. This header is optional in the sense that some
files (specifically, object files) do not have it. For image files, this header is re-
quired. An object file can have an optional header, but generally this header
has no function in an object file except to increase its size. These features
are extracted from the optional header of the PE. It contains information
about the logical layout of the PE file, such as the address of the entry point,
the alignment of sections and the sizes of part of the file in memory;
MS-DOS Header (17 features) TheMS-DOS executable-file header contains
four distinct parts: a collection of header information (such as the signature
word, the file size, etc.), a reserved section, a pointer to a Windows header
(if one exists), and a stub program. MS-DOS uses the stub program to dis-
play a message if Windows has not been loaded when the user attempts to
run a program. In this contest, we are interested in features related to the
execution of the file, including the number of bytes in the last page of the
file, the number of pages or the starting address of the Relocation Table;
File Header (7 features) The Windows executable-file header contains infor-
mation that the loader requires for segmented executable files. This includes
the linker version number, data specified by the linker, data specified by
the resource compiler, tables of segment data and tables of resource data.
Moreover, the features related to this class highlights information about
timestamp and the CPU platform which the PE is intended for.
Obfuscated String Statistics (3 features) Malware authors encode strings
in their programs to hide malicious capabilities and impede reverse engi-
neering. Even simple encoding schemes defeat the “Strings” tool and com-
plicate static and dynamic analysis. In addition to PEFrame, we use func-
tionalities of the FireEye Labs Obfuscated String Solver (FLOSS 3). It is
an open source tool that automatically detects, extracts and decodes obfus-
cated strings, such as malicious domains, IP addresses, suspicious file paths,
etc.from Windows Portable Executable files availing of advanced static anal-
ysis techniques. We use this tool to compute some statistics, like how many
entry-points or relocations are present in the file.
Imports Features (158 features) Following the Header are the actual sec-
tions of the file, each of which contains useful information. In particular,
the .rdata section typically contains import and export information. Some-
times there is the possibility for a double section existing, one relative to the
import function (.idata), and the other relative to the export one (.edata).
Functions can be imported from other executables or from DLLs. We are
interested in the import of a specific set of known DLLs and APIs, and use
3 https://github.com/fireeye/flare-floss
their occurrences as feature. We also use three counters representing the to-
tal number of imported APIs, the total number of imported DLLs, and the
total number of exported functions.
Function lengths (50 features) FLOSS also provides measurements of func-
tion lengths. This class contains different counters to store that information.
Due to the huge number of different functions, we use bucketing to reduce
the number of possible features.
Directories (65 features) The data directory indicates where to find other
important components of the executable information in the file. It is simply
an array located at the end of the optional header providing information
regarding addresses and sizes about the different data structure of the PE
file. Similarly to what we do for imports, we check the occurrence in the file
of some particular directory names, using their size as features.
3.2 Random Forest Classifier
A Random Forest [4] is a classification tool that aggregates the results provided
by a set of Decision Trees through a Bootstrap aggregated (a.k.a. Bagging) tech-
nique.
In general, a Decision Tree [6] is a decision support tool that uses a tree-like
graph as model of decisions. In particular, it is a map of the possible outcomes
of a series of related choices, allowing a user to weigh possible actions against
one another based on their costs, probabilities and benefits. In machine learning
science, Decision tree learning concept uses decision trees as a predictive
model to go from observations about an object to conclusion about the objects’
target value, represented in the leaves of the tree.
Although single decision trees can be effective classifiers, increased accu-
racy often can be achieved by combining the results of a collection of decision
trees. This is indeed a well-known procedure called Bootstrap Aggregation or
Bagging that reduces variance combining the predictions from multiple high-
variance decision trees to make more accurate predictions that any individual
model.
Random Forest Classifier is a supervised classification algorithm. As high-
lighted by the name, it creates a forest by randomly ensembling different deci-
sion trees. The ensemble method for random forest is focused on feature bagging
concept, which has the advantage of significantly decreasing the correlation be-
tween each decision tree and thus increasing, on average, its predictive accuracy.
Feature bagging works by randomly selecting a subset of the feature dimensions
at each split in the growth of the individual decision tress. Although this might
sound counterproductive since it is often desired to include as many features as
possible, it has the purposes of deliberately avoiding on average very strong pre-
dictive features that lead to similar splits in trees, thereby increasing correlation.
If a particular feature is strong in predicting the response value, then it will be
selected for many trees.
To classify a new object from an input vector, the algorithm uses the input
vector into each of the trees composing the forest. Each tree gives a “vote”
classification for that class, and the forest chooses the classification having the
highest number of votes among all the trees in the forest.
3.3 Isolation Forest Classifier
In classification problems, there is the possibility to rely on one-class classifi-
cation, where samples used in training phase belong to the same class and in
the classification phase we use the classifier to identify outliers, i.e. sample not
belonging to the class used for training.
Isolation forest [14] is a one-class classifier, which data structure is built
on the same conceptual principle of Random forest. In particular, an Isolation
forest is still an ensemble of bootstrapped decision trees, but, instead of profiling
normal points, it outcomes all possible anomalies that are isolated with respect
to the models just created. As stated by Zhou et al. [14], anomalies are data
patterns that have different data characteristics from normal instances. Many
existing model-based approaches to anomaly detection construct a profile of
normal instances, and hence identify instances not conform to the normal profile
as isolated.
Technically speaking, isolation forest algorithm isolates observation by ran-
domly selecting a feature and then randomly selecting a split value between the
maximum and minimum values of the selected features. Hence, the algorithm
first constructs the separation by creating isolation trees or random decision
trees; then, when they collectively produce shorter path lengths for some partic-
ular points, they are highly likely to be anomalies. Based on the average path
length derived in testing phase, it calculates the anomaly score for each sample.
In the various online tool libraries, it is possible to set a tolerance threshold that
discriminates the given sample as isolated or not according to the model: the
higher it is, more tolerant the isolation forest is with anomalies.
3.4 Principles of features reduction
When dealing with high-dimensional features space, it is actually infeasible to
think that each feature has the same “importance”. In particular, both redun-
dant and irrelevant features exist. Feature reduction techniques can be hence
used to reduce the dataset dimensionality in order to facilitate training pro-
cess, decrease training and classification computational time, reduce the variance
among features, and avoid curse of dimensionality, i.e. with the increasing of the
dimensionality, space volume increases so fast that training data become sparse.
In this paper, for features reduction purpose, we rely on the Linear Dis-
criminant Analysis (LDA) technique, because of its simplicity. LDA is a gener-
alization of Fisher’s linear discriminant [22], a method used in statistics, pattern
recognition and machine learning to project the feature space in a smaller feature
space through a linear combination of features. In practice, given the original
dimension M of the features, it is possible to reduce the dimension to a chosen L
by projecting into the linear subspace HL maximizing inter-class variance after
projection.
Table 1: APTs elements per classes
Class Count
Patchwork 559
APT29 205
Winnti Group 176
Carbanak 105
Volatile Cedar 35
NSA 13
Transparent Tribe 267
Shiqiang 31
Roaming Tiger 14
Mirage 54
Class Count
Lazarus Group 58
Sandwork 44
Hurricane Panda 315
APT30 101
Violin Panda 23
Desert Falcon 45
Molerats 25
APT28 68
Lotus Blossom 48
4 Methodology
In this section, we define the methodologies that lead us to define the proposed
framework with high performances. In particular, in Section 4.1, we explain
the feature extraction process, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we respectively discuss
Multi-Class methodologies proposed in [12] by Baldoni et al. w.r.t. the One-Class
classification approach through which we implement the malware triage.
4.1 Features Extraction
We have built our knowledge base by crawling external publicly-available sources
to collect reports related to malicious campaigns, activities and software associ-
ated to APTs. These reports are produced by security firms and contain different
Indicator of Compromises (IoCs) related to specific APTs, including domains,
IPs and MD5 of malware. APTnotes4 provides a Coma-Separated Values (.csv)
containing more than 400 APT reports, with Title, Source, Link, Date and
SHA1 for each file. Reports contain a rich description relative to known APT
campaigns, showing details of the attacks such as the vulnerabilities exploited,
infecting vectors, C&C domains and IPs and, in most cases, at least one MD5 of
the executable involved in the attack. Since the supervised nature of the inner
framework classifier, we have to discriminate in each report a relative APT class,
in order to correctly label each of the available source. Hence, with IoC Parser
tool5, we extrapolate hashes in the file in order to crawl for the correlative bi-
nary. As shown in Table 1, we come up with more than 2,000 samples related
to nineteen distinct classes. Retrieved the malware samples, we process them
with the PEFrame tool to extract features from each binary. As highlighted in
Section 3.1, for each analyzed executable, the extraction tool provides us seven
distinct features classes with more than 300 characteristics.
4 https://github.com/aptnotes
5 https://github.com/armbues/ioc_parser
4.2 Multi-class classification
The framework proposed by Baldoni et al. [12] creates multi-class model in
order to deal with APT classification. In particular, they rely on Random-Forest
classifier, using samples related to known APTs for training. They also consider
for training phase an additional class to represent all the samples that have not
been created by any known APT. However, the elements constituent this latter
class are not homogeneous among them: if it is possible to define a classification
model for any APT class since the similarity among elements produced by the
same organization, the same concept is not applicable for malware not related to
APT. Moreover, the inequality amount of samples belonging to this class with
the respect to other classes leads to an excessive imbalance in the training set.
For this reason, in training phase, authors only consider classes of known APT.
In order to discriminate a sample as not related to any APT, they produce a
threshold for each class in the Knowledge Base (KB): if a given sample analyzed
is under each APT threshold, it is considered to represent a non-APT malware.
Baldoni et al. tested the algorithm with 10-fold cross validation, a common
value in literature. For each execution, they generate the model with k − 1
folds and test it with both the remaining fold and all the collected malware not
developed by APTs.
4.3 One-class classification
In the multi-class classification, each single APT sample that is going to enforce
the Knowledge Base needs a total re-processing phase for Random Forest in
order to reproduce each APT threshold, wasting time and resources. Instead of
relying on multi-class classification, indeed, we are going to generate, for each
single APT class, an Isolation Forest, that creates a model that identifies all
those elements belonging to it while discarding all anomalies. If a given sample
passes “unnoticed” through each APT classifier, it is considered not related to
any known APT. When a single known APT aimed to enforce our knowledge base
is identified, we simply re-process training phase for the related APT classifier.
We implemented our classifiers on the open-source Scikit library6, that pro-
vides different machine learning tools in Python programming language. Linear
discriminant analysis has been used to reduce the feature dimensionality from
300 to 18 features7. After having split the dataset in training set and valida-
tion set through 10-folder cross-validation, we have trained one isolation forest
for each class. Isolation Forest implementation requires two main arguments to
tune the fitting phase: contamination expresses how much the classifier has to
be tolerant in creating the model for detecting outliers; number of estimators
is an attribute totally related to the tree-nature of the Isolation Forest and it
defines how many trees it has to use in the ensemble methods. Despite the train-
ing set of each class is not contaminated by outliers, malware samples have high
6 http://scikit-learn.org/
7 We decided to relate the number of projection to the number of APTs considered,
however other values should be investigated.
feature variability, hence we decided to provide a non-zero value to contamina-
tion. This means that some of the training samples can be wrongly considered
as outliers, but increases precision in the classification phase. In order to tune
the 〈contamination, number of estimators〉 tuple for achieving the best result
for each Isolation Forest classifier, we perform cross-validation over the APT
training set to generate confusion matrix for each APT class and the relative
performances of the classifiers.
In the choice of the correct parameters, we mainly rely on i) Precision, since
the malware triage nature of the proposed framework. Facing with an high value
of false positives is deleterious due to the fact that human analysts are lim-
ited resources and the triage approach must reduce as much as possible their
workload by striving to deliver them only samples that are highly confidently
related to known APTs; ii) Accuracy, expressing how much the APT classifier
is accurate in determining the right APT class of an APT sample. The choice of
the contamination-number of estimators parameters for the Isolation Forest is
hence totally based on precision-accuracy trade-off. Since the triage nature of the
framework, we have been more oriented to tune this diatribe toward precision
measure, due to stating a given sample belongs or not to a given APT is more
effective, in a triage, than declaring that an APT sample belongs to a class.
5 Analysis
To show that also this new approach can achieve good results we evaluate it with
in different ways. In Section 5.1, we consider only the output of the algorithm
as belonging or not belonging to any APTs, in order to test and measure the
performances of the triage work that discriminates APT samples from the non-
APT ones. In Section 5.2, we identify, among the samples previously labeled to
belong to some APT, the relative APT class, showing the achieved results for
each classifier. Finally, in Section 5.3, we compare our work with some of the
aforementioned frameworks presented in Section 2.
A draft of the code with the used dataset can be found on GitHub8
5.1 APT-Triage
In order to generate a clear and uniformed test, we rely on Stratified 10-Fold
Validation, available on Scikit. In particular, it splits data in train/test sets,
preserving the percentage of samples for each class. For each APT class in the
dataset, we train an Isolation Forest with the samples related to that class, thus
creating 19 Isolation Forests. A sample is recognized to belong to some APT if
at least one of the Isolation Forest outputs it belongs to its class. Contrarily, a
malware is classified as non-APT if no one of the classifiers recognizes it.
With the priori knowledge of which element really belongs to APT or non-
APT class, it has been possible to plot a global confusion matrix that shows how
many samples have correctly been labeled.
8 https://github.com/GiuseppeLaurenza/I_F_Identifier
Table 2 shows the results obtained in term of quality measures: we achieve
our goal of maximize the precision, in fact we obtain a 100% precision, meaning
that non-APT samples have never been identified as APT, and an accuracy of
95%. Our system do not achieve a very high recall, but this was an expected
result and it is not a real problem, due to the fact that the goal of this preliminary
phase in a complex architecture is the detection of malware that belongs to APT
with high probability. However we remind that APT samples not recognized by
any Isolation Forest are not excluded by further analysis of the security expert:
simply they are not prioritized to a prompt and deep analysis.
5.2 APT identification
We here evaluate the ability of the trained isolation forests to exactly identify the
APT the sample belongs to. Hence, we have analyzed the performances of each
classifier in the labeling process of its relative samples, over all samples that in the
triage have been labeled as APT members. We provide global confusion matrix
and metrics in Table 3, calculated as the sum of each APT confusion matrixes. In
the table related APT identify the APT the isolation forest is trained to while
other APT identifies the set of samples belonging to other APTS. non-APT
samples are not involved in this analysis.
The overall results, presented in Table 3, points out an accuracy up to 98%
and a precision of 86%. The proposed framework shows high performances in
almost each APT classifier, in particular for accuracy measure: hence, if a pre-
vious classifier recognizes a determined sample to belong to its model, we are
confident this identification is truthful. When dealing with Advanced Persistent
Threat knowledge base construction, however, it can exist an inner imprecision
in the discrimination between distinct APTs, derived by the possible in-common
implementation or use of the same tools (e.g. Poison Ivy [3], a known toolset used
by different APTs). Thus, reports describing operations of a particular threat
might contain MD5 also related to another APT, impacting on the classifier
prediction and producing possible true-negative.
5.3 Comparison with the State of the Art
Both the multi-class classification approach proposed in [12] and our one-class
technique reach encouraging results. In particular, the framework proposed by
Table 2: APT/non-APT Confusion Matrix.
(a) Confusion matrix
Predicted
non-APTs APTs
True
non-APTs 8620 0
APTs 495 1711
(b) Performance
measures
Accuracy: 95%
Precision: 100%
Recall: 77%
F1-Score: 87%
Table 3: Global APT Results
(a) Confusion matrix
Predicted
Other APTs Related APT
True
Other APTs 41475 249
Related APT 533 1663
(b) Performance
measures
Accuracy: 98%
Precision: 86%
Recall: 75%
F1-Score: 80%
Baldoni et al. shows a precision of 100% and an accuracy of 96% in the detection
of APT samples, while, in our work, we still have a precision of 100%, and an
accuracy up to 95%. However, tests in [12] have been performed on a smaller
number of APT sets, presenting low variability in their samples. Moreover, as
already discussed in Section 4.3, the structure of our framework leads to a perfor-
mant modularity, allowing to quickly train each single classifier without wasting
time and resources in the calculation of the threshold for each single class.
In [18], the automated framework proposed by Nari and Ghorbani aims to
classify malware samples with analysis of network behavior. They use more than
2907 malware samples distinguished among 13 malware families, reaching an
accuracy of 94%. We outperform these results reaching an accuracy up to 98%
and a precision of 100% on the 19 APT class considered.
In [5], an anomaly detection system for APTs is built around several security
logs caught. The objective of this work is related to alert the security analysts
in case an activity deviates from the normal behavior defined by ADS. However,
the powerful, effectiveness and system-adaptive campaigns acted by APTs lead
these approaches to not be able to dynamically react to these threats.
Rieck et al. [20] exploit SVM classifiers for constructing models able to classify
14 of the most common Windows malware families. In particular, they rely on
the analysis of dynamic features extrapolated by supervising malware behavior
in a safe environment. In addition to the slowness in creating feature vectors due
to dynamic analysis, they reach an accuracy of 88%, really far from our results
up to 98%.
6 Conclusion
Among the huge amount of malware daily produced, those developed by Ad-
vanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are highly relevant, as they are part of mas-
sive and dangerous campaigns that can exfiltrate information and undermine or
impede critical operations of a target.
This work improves the previous automatic malware triage process, reduc-
ing the computational resources and the time required for the training phase
and providing a greater flexibility. These improvement are achieved through
the changing of the classification approach, moving from a single Multi-Class
Classifier to a set of One Class classifiers. Both algorithms were used with fea-
tures obtained by static analysis on available malware known to be developed
by APTs, as attested by public reports. Although static features alone are not
sufficient to completely exclude relations with APTs, they allow to perform a
quick triage and prioritize the analysis of malware that surely deserve higher
attention, with minimal risk of wasting analysts time. In fact, the experimental
evaluation has shown encouraging results: malware developed by known APTs
have been detected with a precision of 100% and an accuracy up to 95%.
As future work, first of all, we want to enlarge the Knowledge Base. In this
work we have realized classifiers relative to 19 distinct classes, but the actual
number of APTs is higher. Thus, we are interested to enriching our Knowledge
Base by crawling other public APT reports, in order to be able to detect, among
the huge number of malware delivered per day, the ones more relevant for further
analysis.
Another interesting future development regards the improving of the classi-
fication through the revise of the features reduction phase and the classification
algorithm. For the former, we want to observe the impact of variation of the
number of projections or applying other techniques like Principal Component
Analysis ; for the latter we want to test algorithms based on different principles
respect to Isolation Forests, examining the possibility to rely on different ap-
proaches (not necessarily based on machine learning tools) for different APTs.
This is a strong advantage of our new work, in fact we should use different classi-
fication algorithm for different APTs, choosing each time the one that performs
better or combining the output of more single classifiers.
Another aspect that we want to study is the use of a different type of features:
both our works use static features in order to provide a fast response, but there
are many obfuscation techniques that can hide characteristics useful for the APT
identification. To overcome these protections made by adversary, it is always
possible to use also dynamic analysis tools that can observe the behavior of the
malware. Even if this tools require a higher amount of time respect to the static
ones, we can use dynamic analysis in a second step after the first triage one, in
order to validate results of the first phase or take decision on samples that have
not been identified in the first step, but whose classification score is close to the
threshold.
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